The recent surge in blockchain applications and database systems has renewed the interest in traditional Byzantine Fault Tolerant consensus protocols (BFT). Several such BFT protocols follow a primary-backup design, in which a primary replica coordinates the consensus protocol. In primary-backup designs, the normal-case operations are rather simple. At the same time, primary-backup designs place an unreasonable burden on primaries and allows malicious primaries to affect the system throughput substantially, however. To resolve this situation, we propose the MultiBFT paradigm, a protocol-agnostic approach towards improving the performance of primary-backup consensus protocols. At the core of MultiBFT is an approach to continuously order the client-transactions by running several instances of the underlying BFT protocol in parallel. We bring forth our paradigm to two well-established BFT protocols and demonstrate that the rendered parallelized protocols are not only safe and live but also significantly outperform, up to 2×, their original non-parallelized forms. Further, we show that our Multi-BFT paradigm reaches a throughput of up to 320K transactions per second.
INTRODUCTION
The recent surge in blockchain technology has led to the design of several blockchain database systems (henceforth referred to as BDBs) [3, 24, 25, 49] . These BDBs employ a Byzantine-Fault Tolerant consensus protocol (BFT) to make a traditional database faulttolerant [10, 53, 67] . Given a set of replicas and a client transaction, a BFT protocol helps to reach an agreement on the order for that client transaction among all the correct replicas, even if some of the replicas are byzantine.
Although these fault-tolerant BDBs are safe, their throughput is much less (of the order 10K txns/s) than state-of-the-art database systems, which can easily achieve throughputs of the order 100K txns/s [28, 29] . The key reason for these BDBs attaining low throughput is their dependence on a single replica designated as the primary. Existing database systems, on the other hand, allow all of their replicas to serve the clients and employ a concurrency control protocol to ensure a single state across all the replicas [28] .
This single-primary design is expensive for the primary, as it not only receives all the client transactions, but also has to ensure that a consensus on the order for these transactions is reached among all the other replicas (backups). Consequently, the primary has a higher load than the other replicas and acts as a bottleneck in the overall system throughput. Further, a byzantine primary can tactically derail the system throughput, and such an attack may not always be detected. If a primary is detected as byzantine, then these protocols require primary replacement. This replacement process, which helps to guarantee liveness, causes performance degradation as consensus needs to be repeated on all the requests since the last stable state.
In this paper, we learn from the existing database systems and envision the design of a blockchain database system, ResilientDB, 1 that allows several of its replicas to act as primaries. To ensure this, we introduce a protocol-agnostic, Multiple Byzantine Fault-Tolerance paradigm (referred to as MultiBFT). MultiBFT takes as input an existing primary-backup BFT consensus protocol and requires each replica to run multiple instances of the protocol in parallel. Further, to improve load-balancing, MultiBFT ensures that each instance is managed by a distinct primary replica. Each primary receives a client transaction and leads the consensus on this transaction. After all instances at a replica have reached consensus on their transactions, these transactions are executed at the replica in a deterministic order (which is the same across all replicas). The parallel instances not only help MultiBFT to achieve higher throughput but also help in monitoring malicious primary attacks. Moreover, our MultiBFT paradigm helps to yield continuous-ordering BFT protocols that always order a subset of client requests.
The key challenge for MultiBFT is to thwart collusion attacks by multiple malicious primaries. Such a critical attack can ensure that none of the good replicas make any progress. Although some prior works [4, 64] have presented BFT protocols that employ multiple primaries, these works neither acknowledge collusion attacks, nor present efficient recovery from such attacks. Further, these protocols attain negligible throughputs until the system has fully recovered. We show that our MultiBFT paradigm not only detects and defends against such attacks but also maintains high throughput, while assuring that ResilientDB maintains safety.
In specific, we make the following key contributions:
(1) We present our protocol-agnostic MultiBFT paradigm that supports efficient parallelization of a BFT protocol and ensures continuous-ordering of client transactions. We envision MultiBFT to be readily integrated with several BFT protocols such as Pbft [10] , CBASE [36] , FaB [46] , ZZ [71] and Zyzzyva [35] . (2) MultiBFT is not only safe and live, but also detects and defends against collusion attacks that arise due to the existence of multiple primaries. (3) We build a prototype blockchain database, ResilientDB, that permits multiple of its replicas to act as primaries and employs our MultiBFT paradigm. Further, we implemented the architecture of each replica with efficient parallel pipelines for better task management. (4) We also evaluate our MultiBFT paradigm against three stateof-the-art BFT protocols: Zyzzyva [35] , Pbft [10] , and Hot-Stuff [74] . We show that our paradigm attains a throughput of up to 320K txns/s. (5) The effectiveness and scalability of our MultiBFT paradigm is demonstrated by the fact that our paradigm achieves a throughput of 210K txns/s on 46 replicas, which is at least 5× the throughput reported by existing blockchain database systems and applications operating on only 4 replicas [3, 19, 25, 49, 57, 60, 72 ].
WHY BFT PROTOCOLS?
BFT protocols lie at the core of blockchain applications, which have received sudden interest lately. The key reasons for this interest are intertwined with the design of BFT protocols: they can provide reliable replication among untrusted replicas (decentralization) while giving all replicas equal influence on replication (democracy). Initial blockchain applications, such as Bitcoin [48] , opted for a permissionless setting, where any replica can participate in consensus. These applications employ the Proof-of-Work algorithm (PoW) for achieving consensus among replicas [31] . However, PoW is susceptible to attacks, computationally expensive, yields low throughput, and incurs high latencies [20, 21, 26, 54, 55, 69] . This led the blockchain community to consider the design of permissioned blockchains, which employ traditional BFT protocols [10, 35] . By only allowing a known set of replicas to participate, permissioned blockchains can facilitate decentralization and democracy with low costs and high performance. Consequently, we see a rise in the design of permissioned blockchain database systems (BDBs) that combine database and blockchain functionality [3, 24, 25, 49] .
These BDBs attain much less throughput than traditional database systems, as BDBs employ unoptimized single-primary BFT consensus protocols. Consequently, our MultiBFT paradigm is in order, as it improves throughput significantly.
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MULTIBFT
The MultiBFT paradigm proposes to parallelize primary-backup BFT consensus protocols. Using parallelization, MultiBFT ensures that the resultant consensus protocol supports continuous-ordering: the non-faulty replicas are always accepting and ordering client requests with maximal throughput, this independent of any malicious behavior or attack. Figure 2 illustrates a succinct representation of our MultiBFT paradigm. For the sake of explanation, we present a single round of MultiBFT in three stages: replication, unification, and execution. The notion of a round helps in generating a common order and recovering failed instances. Later, we discuss how the concept of rounds does not affect individual primaries from working independently.
Prior to any round, MultiBFT takes as input a BFT consensus protocol (say X ) and requires each replica to run z instances of that protocol in parallel. A round begins when each instance receives a request from a client. 2 Firstly, in the replication stage, each instance runs the protocol X on its client request. Secondly, in the unification stage, the replica waits for all its z instances to complete replication (reach consensus on a request). If every instance successfully replicates a request, then a common order for execution of these requests is determined. If one or more instances are unable to replicate requests, then some of the instances must have byzantine primaries and recovery is initiated. Finally, in the execution stage, each replica executes all the client requests in the common order.
Preliminaries
To present our MultiBFT paradigm in detail, we first introduce some notations and assumptions. We represent a replicated database by a triple S = (C , R, M) in which C is the set of clients using the service, R is the set of replicas and M ⊂ R is the set of malicious replicas that exhibit byzantine behavior. We write n = |R | and f = |M| to denote the number of replicas and malicious replicas, respectively. We assume n > 3f . The set of non-faulty replicas, denoted by nf(S), is defined as nf(S) = R \ M.
With each replica R ∈ R, we associate a set of z = f +1 instances, denoted is(R). We write is(S) = R ∈R is(R) to denote the set of all replica instances. To identify replicas and their instances we employ numeric identifiers: we simply write I i,x to denote the x-th instance running on the i-th replica, 1 ≤ x ≤ z and 1 ≤ i ≤ n. With each instance x, 1 ≤ x ≤ z, we associate a primary P x that coordinates replication among all instances I i,x , 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We assume that each instance has a distinct primary (running on distinct replicas), that is, for all 1 ≤ x < y ≤ z, P x P y .
We employ cryptography to prevent malicious replicas from impersonating non-faulty replicas. Each client or replica s ∈ (C ∪ R) can sign messages [34] . Each client also has access to a cryptographic hash function that it can use to generate digests D(v) of values v.
We assume that malicious replicas cannot forge signed messages and message digests of non-faulty replicas. A signed message is well-formed if it passes all checks that guarantee its authenticity and integrity.
Optimal Primary Set. In ResilientDB, we require a total of z replicas to act as primary: at each replica there are z BFT instances running concurrently. We use z = f + 1 as the minimal value, which is sufficient to guarantee at least a single instance with a non-faulty primary. This enables MultiBFT to support the continuous-ordering property. Furthermore, using z = f + 1 already guarantees effective parallelism, this with minimal contention among the instances for underlying resources. Several prior works [23, 64] suggest using all n replicas as primary. This approach has two counter-effects: (i) as the number of replicas increase, there exists a trade-off between the contention among the instances for available resources (underlying cores) and useful parallelism; and (ii) if even one of the replicas is malicious or byzantine, the system throughput can get affected.
Client Replica Mapping. We require each primary to order (or replicate) client transactions. A malicious client can abuse this design in request duplication attacks, in which it sends a single request to distinct primaries. Such an attack would waste resources. To prevent request duplication, MultiBFT partitions the clients C into z sets C 0 , . . . , C z−1 , and assigns each client C, C ∈ C , with identifier id(C) to set C id(C) mod z . All requests from clients in C x are handled by the primary of the x-th instance. This deterministic distribution of clients prevents request duplication attacks. However, it does allow malicious primaries to ignore requests of some of its assigned clients, causing a denial-of-service attack. We discuss how to prevent denial-of-service in Section 3.6.
Stages of MultiBFT
In each round of MultiBFT, each of the z instances at a replica run their BFT consensuses in parallel, after which the instances coordinate to ensure that all replicas reach the same state. To do so, the following three steps take place:
(S1) Replication: Each instance x, 1 ≤ x ≤ z, replicates a request T x corresponding to some client request. (S2) Unification: All the z instances unify to ensure that each non-faulty replica receives all the z requests T 1 , . . . , T z . (S3) Execution: The requests T 1 , . . . , T z are executed in a deterministic order. Figure 3 illustrates these three steps in detail. Replication is achieved by running a BFT consensus protocol that meets the following four requirements:
(R1) If the primary is not detected faulty, then at least n − 2f ≥ f + 1 non-faulty replicas will learn a request. (R2) If f + 1 non-faulty replicas are unable to learn a request, then the primary will be detected as faulty. (R3) If two non-faulty replicas learn requests T 1 and T 2 , then T 1 = T 2 . (R4) A primary can always be replaced. The second step, unification, performs minimal coordination among the z instances at each replica to ensure client transactions Create f+1 instances at each replica.
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Input BFT protocol. are executed in a deterministic order, regardless of the byzantine replicas. Next, we describe these steps.
Replication
MultiBFT supports any BFT protocols that is based on the primarybackup design of Pbft. Given such a protocol, MultiBFT requires each replica to independently run z instances of the protocol in parallel:
MultiBFT models each replica R as a set of instances is(R). Each instance I R,x ∈ is(R), 1 ≤ x ≤ z, operates a BFT consensus protocol as a black-box. In a single round r , each instance undergoes a single consensus. Each instance either successfully completes consensus or observes that the consensus has failed.
If the x-th instance at a replica completes the consensus successfully in round r , then the corresponding primary P x behaved non-faulty. In other words, P x was able to replicate a client transaction across all the x-th instances. If the x-th instance at a replica observes that the consensus has failed, then MultiBFT expects the underlying BFT protocol to provide steps to help detect the faulty primary, such that MultiBFT can coordinate recovery.
Correctness of Per-Instance Replication. We require that the BFT protocol used at each instance is correct. If the primary P x is nonfaulty, then each non-faulty replica will be able to complete consensus of the x-th instance and log a proof of accepting the request T x . A correct consensus protocol guarantees that only a single client request can get accepted and logged per consensus (Requirement R3). Note that Pbft-style protocols state that a client request can only get accepted if it has been acknowledged by at least n − f ≥ 2f + 1 replicas. Out of these n − f replicas, at least n − 2f ≥ f + 1 replicas (a majority) are non-faulty, as at most f replicas can be byzantine [10, 35] .
However, if the primary P x behaves faulty (or malicious), then not all the x-th instances will accept and log the request. A primary can broadly behave malicious in two distinct ways, which we describe next.
If the primary P x is faulty, then consensus on a client request could be reached among less than f + 1 non-faulty replicas. (e.g., P x may not send the client request T x to at least f + 1 non-faulty replicas). Hence, no non-faulty replica will accept and log the client request T x . Existing BFT consensus protocols deal with this behavior using a view-change protocol that uses a bounded-delay assumption on message delivery [10, 11, 71] . The view-change protocol requires each replica to: locally detect failure of consensus by using timers; notify other replicas about the lack of progress by sending a view-change request; reach agreement on primary failure (after receiving at least f + 1 view-change requests, which guarantees that one request came from a non-faulty replica); deterministically elect the new primary, and finally, replace the primary. Hence, the view-change protocol helps meet Requirements R2 and R4.
If the primary is malicious, then it can ensure that consensus is reached among a set S of at least n − 2f ≥ f + 1 non-faulty replicas, In this case, only the non-faulty replicas in S accept and log the client request T x , and the primary can collude with the other malicious replicas and ensure that the remaining non-faulty replicas are unable to reach consensus on T x (are left in the dark). Clearly, these remaining replicas will request a view-change, but will not be successful. To succeed, some of the replicas in S also have to request a view-change, but from their point of view it is impossible to distinguish between the non-faulty replicas left in the dark (at most f ) and the malicious replicas (also at most f ). Correct BFT protocols typically provide a checkpoint protocol [10, 35] , which facilitates state-exchange, to ensure that eventually all replicas are able to learn all replicated requests, independent of any malicious behavior of the primary.
Unification
In the previous section, we saw that each instance at each replica is led by its own primary and will try to replicate a client request in each round r . After this replication, there is a need to determine a global order for all the requests replicated successfully by the z instances. To determine this order, MultiBFT provides unification, which performs the following three tasks: (i) global ordering; (ii) unified multi-leader election; and (iii) online recovery.
Deterministic Global
Ordering. Unification guarantees execution of client requests in a common order across all replicas. If all z instances at a replica are able to successfully replicate their requests, then we execute these requests in a deterministic order. For this purpose, we employ a separate execute-thread at each replica. When an instance replicates its client request in round r , it notifies the execute-thread. If the execute-thread receives notification from all z instances (and has already executed requests for round r − 1), then it executes the requests of round r . One can simply execute the requests in the instance order. For example, if x < y, then requests of the y-th instance are executed after requests of the x-th instance.
Alternative Approach to Order Requests. Although deterministic ordering of requests is simple, it also gives earlier instances disproportional control over execution.
To resolve this shortcoming, we propose deterministic selection of a different permutation of the order of execution in every round. For any sequence S of k = |S | ≤ z requests, there exist k! distinct permutations. To select one of these permutations deterministically among all replicas, we first will construct a function that maps an integer h ∈ {0, . . . , k!−1} to a unique permutation. Then we discuss how the replicas will uniformly pick h. As there are k! permutations of S, we can construct the bijection:
The result of f S (D(S) mod |S |!), with D(D) the digest of the sequence S of all replicated requests of the round, allows all non-faulty replicas to determine a fair and correct order of execution. This approach ensures that no instance has any reliable influence on the order in which the client requests of a single round are executed across all the replicas.
Unified Multi-Leader Election.
If an x-th instance is led by a faulty primary, then it might fail to replicate a request. As stated in Section 3.3, this only happens if the faulty primary P x affects the xth instances running at at least f +1 non-faulty replicas. Traditional BFT protocols are able to detect and replace such a primary through the view-change protocol. However, the replacement suggested by these protocols does not work for a parallel paradigm like MultiBFT.
Example 3.2. Consider round r of MultiBFT where two replicas R 5 and R 6 are each running three instances in parallel. The first and second instances both detect that their primaries (residing on replicas R 1 and R 2 , respectively) need to be replaced. Hence instances I 5,1 , I 5,2 , I 6,1 , and I 6,2 are replacing their primaries. At R 5 , the first instance I 5,1 detects a need for primary replacement before the second instance, I 5,2 . Due to random delays in communication and parallel processing, at R 6 the second instance I 6,2 detects a need for primary replacement before the first instance, I 6,1 .
If we replace the primaries at each instance without any coordination between the instances, then each instance would simply pick the first available replica to be its primary. We require one replica to be the primary of only one instance. Hence, we will use the next two freely available replicas, say R 3 and R 4 . At R 5 , I 5,1 chooses I 3,1 as its primary, and I 5,2 chooses I 4,2 as its primary. At R 6 , I 6,2 chooses I 3,2 as its primary, and I 6,1 chooses I 4,1 as its primary. Due to the lack of coordination, there is no agreement on the primaries for the first and second instances between R 5 and R 6 and at least one of these replicas will fail in future rounds. Example 3.2 shows that traditional approach of replacing one primary cannot be used to replace multiple primaries. Our unified primary replacement protocol, part of unification, helps to resolve this situation. We require each non-faulty replica to maintain an internal state (primary, kmal, replace), in which primary : {1, . . . , z} → R maps each instance onto its primary, kmal ⊆ M is the set of known Figure 4 : Attack by malicious primaries (P 1 and P 2 ), which send operations to only a safe subset of good replicas (f + 1).
faulty replicas, and replace is a list of instances that request primary replacement. Each entry in replace is of the form (x, r ), with x, 1 ≤ x ≤ z, being the instance that detects its primary faulty and r being the round when this detection occurs. At each replica, MultiBFT employs a separate coordinator-thread to maintain this internal state. If the x-th instance at replica R i , determines in round r that its primary (primary[x]) is malicious, then it places an entry (x, r ) in replace and waits until the coordinator assigns a new primary.
The coordinator at R i handles entries in replace in increasing round number, and, for entries with the same round number, on increasing instance order. The coordinator only handles an entry (x, r ) ∈ replace if each instance at replica R i has either replicated a request in round r or has requested replacement of its primary.
From Requirement R2 it can be deduced that each instance will always detect in which round its primary became faulty (as that instance is unable to make progress). Thus, the order in which the coordinator handles the entries for replacements guarantees that all primaries are replaced in the same order across all instances at all replicas. To handle (x, r ) ∈ replace, the coordinator removes (x, r ) from replace, adds primary[x] to kmal, and then looks for the first replica R kmal that is not yet a primary (for all j, 1 ≤ j ≤ z, primary[j] R). It then assigns primary[x] = R and signals the x-th instance that a new primary is assigned, after which the new primary of the x-th instance can initiate recovery of the x-th instance. to recover. Note that due to Requirement R4, a correct BFT protocol provides such steps for replacing a primary [10, 35] .
Online Recovery.
It is always possible that a primary acts malicious without being detected. In Section 3.3, we illustrated how traditional BFT protocols can be under such an undetectable attack. Note that even under such an attack, traditional BFT protocols continue to maintain both safety and liveness. However, when a system has multiple primary replicas, then collusion among the malicious replicas can endanger progress of the system: Example 3.3. Consider a service S with f ≥ 2 and malicious replicas are represented by set M, |M | = f . We have f + 1 primaries and we assume that the first two primaries, P 1 and P 2 , are malicious. P 1 and P 2 collude and partition the non-faulty replicas into three sets A, B, and C with |A| = |B| = f and |C | = 1 (see Figure 4 ). Now consider round r in which P 1 initiates consensus for a request T 1 and involves only the replicas in sets (M ∪A ∪C), while P 2 initiates consensus for request T 2 and involves only the replicas in sets (M ∪ B ∪C). All other byzantine replicas collude with the primaries P 1 and P 2 by being involved in consensus for both the requests.
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Coordinator collects requests (and proof) of each of its instances that replicated a request in round r and sends it to all the replicas. Hence, in round r , the non-faulty replicas in A only reach consensus on T 1 , the non-faulty replicas in B only reach consensus on T 2 , and only the one non-faulty replica in C reaches consensus on both T 1 and T 2 . If f ≥ 3, then the above example can be easily extended to ensure that none of the non-faulty replicas reach consensus on all the requests.
The situation in Example 3.3 is of our interest, as it is a result of existence of multiple primaries. Traditional BFT protocols do not face this attack as they only have one primary [10, 35] . Whenever there are multiple primaries, then up to f of them can be byzantine, and each can act malicious by preventing at most f of the replicas from replicating a request. As shown above, this can lead to a situation in which none of the non-faulty replicas have all the requests replicated in a round.
Such a collusion attack would prevent the non-faulty replicas from executing any request and replying to the clients. Further, these malicious primaries cannot be replaced by view-change, as at most f non-faulty replicas are blaming each such malicious primary (while, at the same time, the f byzantine replicas can blame the non-faulty primaries). Why is this attack so critical? If unhandled, it can cause the system to lack liveness (non-faulty replicas are unable to progress).
To address this attack, we first need to detect it. We assign the task of detecting such an attack to the coordinator thread. When the x-th instance at a replica is unable to replicate a request in round r , it sends a view-change message to all the other x-th instances and notifies the coordinator thread. To detect this attack, the coordinator thread uses a timer and waits for f + 1 view-change requests from distinct replicas (and possibly for distinct primaries). If the timer expires and there are not sufficient view-change requests to replace any primaries, then the coordinator detects the attack of Example 3.3.
Note that the coordinator has to distinguish between this attack and the traditional view-change expected by an instance. In both cases, the coordinator waits for f + 1 messages, but the distinction lies whether these messages are blaming one primary or multiple primaries. In Figure 5 we illustrate how the coordinator differentiates between these attacks (as part of unification).
There are three ways to defend against such an attack: (i) optimistic recovery; (ii) pessimistic recovery; and (iii) optimistic replacement. We explain each of them next.
(1) Optimistic Recovery. On detection of the attack of Example 3.3, unification requires the coordinator-thread at each replica to create and transmit a contract to all the other replicas. This contract contains all requests replicated in round r (across all instances), together with proofs that these requests were accepted by |nf(S)| replicas. 3 This contract proves to an affected x-th instance that |nf(S)| x-th instances, at other replicas, have replicated the corresponding request in round r . When a coordinator receives a contract from another replica, then it forwards the individual requests and their proofs to the affected instances. Using this information, each instance at a non-faulty replica can determine the request it should have accepted in round r . (2) Pessimistic Recovery. Instead of letting the coordinator wait until it detects the attack of Example 3.3, we can also simply create and send contracts after every round. In this case, the coordinator acts pessimistic by assuming some primaries are malicious. The benefit of this approach is that there is no wait time if the system is under attack. However, it always adds an extra phase of communication among the replicas, even if the system is not under attack. (3) Optimistic Replacement. Detecting the attack of Example 3.3 provides enough information to determine some primaries are malicious, even if it is impossible to pinpoint which primaries are malicious. One way to deal with this situation, is by simply switching to another set of z primaries in a deterministic fashion. We notice that there are only a finite number of such sets of primaries, hence, one can easily pre-determine a unique order among each such set of primaries. Eventually, this view-shifting process will find a set of non-faulty replicas, preventing future attacks. Although view-shifting works, we do not consider it for practical purposes: view-shifting requires coordination among instances with non-faulty primaries, thereby undoing the continuous-ordering property.
Parallelization Landscape
Our MultiBFT paradigm permits z instances, each coordinated by a distinct primary, to replicate client requests in parallel. In the fault-free case, instances at individual replicas only coordinate execution, this to ensure each replica executes all requests in the same order and, hence, preserves the same state. In the case of failures, coordination is only required between instances with failed primaries, and the cost of coordination is dependent on the cost of the view-change protocol of the underlying BFT protocol.
As we require z > f primary replicas, at least one primary is always guaranteed to be good. The instance corresponding to this primary can continue replicating requests even if other instances have failed. Hence, it is possible that two or more instances at a replica may be replicating requests for different rounds. For example, if the x-th instance is led by a good primary, then it could be replicating requests for some round r + 2, while the y-th instance is trying to replace its primary (which failed in round r ).
We have designed MultiBFT explicitly such that good instances never have to wait for other instances to replicate its requests. This property can be leveraged by the non-faulty replicas to continuously provide replication and ordering throughput, even during failures. This continuous-ordering property is a departure from existing BFT protocols, which typically see large drops of throughput while dealing with failures (e.g., during view-changes).
The only requirement MultiBFT needs for correctness, is that the execution of client requests occurs in rounds. Hence, even though the x-th instance is replicating requests for round r + 2, its requests of round r will only get executed at a replica after all the z instances at that replica have finished round r .
Resolving Client Denial-of-Service
It is possible that a client is assigned to an instance of which the primary decides to indefinitely ignore its request. Typical BFT consensus protocols have ways to detect such behavior as part of their view-change protocol. We also allow clients to change instances: a client can send an instance-change request to another instance. If this instance has a non-faulty primary, then it will accept this request (if it does not yet have a sufficient number of clients, this to prevent targeted attacks by malicious clients).
MULTIBFT IN ACTION
We now illustrate our MultiBFT paradigm by running z instances of the Pbft [10] protocol at each replica. In Figure 6 (a), we assume n = 4 replicas are participating in consensus and up to f = 1 replicas can be byzantine. Each replica runs 2 Pbft instances in parallel (z = f +1). Each instance has a distinct primary, we designate P 1 (at replica 1) as the primary for first instance and P 2 (at replica 2) as the primary for second instance. Each instance receives a transaction from its own client(s).
For the sake of explanation, we only illustrate the normal-case working of Pbft and skip over other protocol details. When a client (C 1 or C 2 ) sends a transaction to its primary (P 1 or P 2 ), the primary starts the Pbft protocol to replicate this transaction. The Pbft protocol requires three phases. In the first phase, each primary assigns a sequence number to the client transaction and proposes this transaction via a Pre-Prepare message to all its corresponding instances (e.g., P 1 sends to all the first instances at each replica). When an instance receives a Pre-Prepare message from its primary, it validates the client transaction (checks authenticity of this transaction) and then shows support for the sequence number proposed by the primary by broadcasting a Prepare message. When an instance receives identical Prepare messages from n − (f + 1) corresponding instances (at distinct replicas), then it gets a guarantee that a majority of the non-faulty instances are also supporting this transaction, and this instance marks itself as prepared. Next, this instance goes ahead and broadcasts a Commit message. When an MultiBFT running Zyzzyva. instance receives n − f identical Commit messages, it gets a guarantee that a majority of the non-faulty instances marked themselves as prepared, and it informs the execution thread. The execution thread waits for both the instances to finish and then executes the transactions and sends responses to the clients.
When the primary of an instance is faulty, then that instance waits on a timer and on timeout sends a View-Change message to all the corresponding instances. The coordinator thread collects any incoming View-Change messages and follows our MultiBFT paradigm to perform unified primary replacement. The new primary instance broadcasts a New-View message to its corresponding instances and resumes the protocol. Figure 6 (b) illustrates a single round of MultiBFT employing Zyzzyva [35] . As Zyzzyva uses speculative execution, it attempts to reach consensus among the replicas in a single phase. 4 Protocols belonging to Zyzzyva family [22, 35, 71] also satisfy the Requirements R1-R4 whenever there is a good client (in Zyzzyva, good clients help in detecting malicious primaries).
CORRECTNESS PROOFS
We now prove correctness of our MultiBFT paradigm and other properties stated in previous sections. First, we introduce the following technical property of unified primary replacement. Lemma 5.1. MultiBFT will replace the primaries in a deterministic order across all the non-faulty replicas.
Proof. Assume that the primaries P x and P y , running at the x-th and y-th instances, are malicious and need to be replaced (x y). By Requirement R2, all the x-th and y-th instances will detect that P x and P y are malicious in some rounds r x and r y . Let R 1 and R 2 be two non-faulty replicas that have the same internal state (primary i , kmal i , replace i ), i ∈ {1, 2}, before replacement of P x and P y . We will prove that R 1 and R 2 end up with the same internal state after unified primary replacement.
If r x < r y or (r x = r y ) ∧ (x < y), then R i will first replace P x , after which P y is replaced. Otherwise, either r y < r x or (r y = r x ) ∧ (y < x) holds, and R i first replaces P y , after which P x is replaced. As R 1 and R 2 have the same internal states and both execute the same replacement steps in the same order, they end up with the same internal state on completion of MultiBFT's unified primary replacement. □
The MultiBFT paradigm can be used to implement a reliable consensus protocol that exploits parallel replication. The paradigm does so by providing the following properties:
Safety property. All the non-faulty replicas in the service will accept, log, and execute the same client-requests in the same order. Liveness property. The service will eventually accept, log, and execute new client-requests. Continuous-ordering property. At all times, the service will accept and log client-requests from some of the clients.
Theorem 5.2. The MultiBFT paradigm provides safety, liveness, and continuous-ordering properties when the underlying consensus protocol running at each instance satisfies the three requirements outlined in Section 3.3.
Proof. First, we prove safety. We observe that we require safety at the instance level. Through Requirement R3, we know that each instance eventually replicates a unique sequence of transactions among n − 2f non-faulty replicas, one transaction per round. Otherwise, the primary of the instance will get replaced due to Requirement R2 and our unified primary replacement protocol. Given this per-instance guarantee and the online recovery provided by unification, all replicas will eventually learn all requests accepted in a round by each of the instances. As all replicas then determine the same deterministic order among the requests of a round, we conclude that MultiBFT guarantees safety.
Next, we prove liveness. Liveness is automatically provided whenever all primaries are non-faulty (via Requirement R1). Due to the assumption that n ≥ 3f +1, there are more than z = f +1 non-faulty replicas. Hence all primaries can be non-faulty. Thus, we need to show that malicious primaries that prevent liveness are eventually replaced by primaries that do not prevent liveness. When a primary is malicious and prevents its instance from completing a round r , then this would invalidate liveness. Via Requirement R2, we are guaranteed that this will be detected in round r . Further, Lemma 5.1 tells us that MultiBFT will eventually propose a correct replacement primary for the affected instance, across all non-faulty replicas. This will lead to a new primary leading the instance. We conclude that eventually all malicious primaries that prevent liveness will be detected and replaced, after which all primaries are non-faulty, and liveness is guaranteed.
Finally, we prove continuous-ordering. In MultiBFT, z = f + 1 primaries are coordinating z instances. Hence, at least one instance is coordinated by a non-faulty primary. This instance accepts and logs client-transactions independent of the other instances, which implies that the transactions of a subset of clients are continuously ordered. □
THE DESIGN OF RESILIENTDB
While laying down the formal description of MultiBFT in the previous section, we made several assumptions that can be relaxed in implementations. Next, we provide specific details of our implementation as part of the ResilientDB blockchain database system that (1) employs parallel pipelines to maximize throughput; (2) utilizes batching to minimize latency; (3) eases implementation of new consensus protocols; and (4) provides an efficient blockchain. Pipelining. One of the key assumption in our description was that each instance performs consensus on only one client-request at a time. In specific, we required an instance to wait for a request to replicate before it can start consensus on the next request. Such an assumption is neither practical, necessary, nor is it followed by any existing BFT consensus protocol [10, 35] . Hence, we learn from existing protocols and we pipeline consensuses of multiple requests. Example 6.1. Assume that P x is the primary for the x-th instance and it starts consensus on request T 1 in round r . When P x gets the next client request T 2 , it marks T 2 for round r + 1 and immediately starts consensus on T 2 . For efficiency, we will not let P x wait for either round r to complete or request T 1 to replicate to the x-th instances on all replicas.
For ResilientDB, the existence of multiple primaries adds no extra difficulty in pipelining, as each primary always specifies the round number for each proposed request and can start the consensus for that request. As each instance only replicates one request per consensus round (Lemma ??), pipelining consensuses does not affect safety. Only the execution-thread uses the notion of rounds to deterministically execute the requests in a unified and correct order.
Designing each replica. In ResilientDB, we associate with each replica a distinct architecture based on the role. Figure 7 presents the architecture for a replica which has an instance acting as the primary. Figure 8 presents the architecture for a replica where none of the instances act as primaries.
In our design, ResilientDB associates multiple input and output threads with each replica. The input-threads receive a set of messages from the network and place them in necessary queues for consumption. At each replica, we have z worker-threads, one for each of the z instances. If one of these instances is also acting as a primary, then the associated replica has two additional batchthreads. Other threads in our design include the execute-thread and coordinator-thread.
Batching. Besides pipelining consensuses and allowing multiple threads to work in parallel, primary replicas in ResilientDB also employ the practice of batching transactions. When batching is employed, each replica treats a batch of transaction as a single request and participates in the consensus of that batch. We also allow clients to send a batch of transactions as a request to optimize sending multiple transactions. Such a practice is typically employed in applications when client perform multiple queries on a database, e.g., financial transactions and service-agreements.
We require the input-thread to assign each incoming client-batch a linearly increasing number. Next, the input-thread places this batch of client transactions in the queue for batch-threads. The batch-threads create transaction managers for each client transaction, batches them together and assigns them a sequence number based on the number set by the input-thread. Prior to creating any batch, the batch-threads also need to validate the client request, which usually requires verifying the client signatures on the request [10] .
When the input-thread at a replica receives a batch, it places it in the queue for the specific worker-thread (one of the z workers). This worker-thread processes this batch according to the underlying consensus protocol (such as preprepare-prepare-commit in Pbft). When a worker-thread accepts the order for its batch, it informs the execute-thread. The execute-thread processes the incoming batch in order, creates responses for the clients, and asks the outputthread to send these responses to the clients. In case of failures the execute-thread also performs the role of a coordinator.
Storage and Ledger Management. ResilientDB facilitates implementation of a scalable and efficient blockchain ledger. A blockchain in its simplest form is a linked-list of blocks. Each replica of Re-silientDB maintains its own copy of the blockchain and uses it to record the client transactions.
The first block in any blockchain is referred to as the genesis block [26] . This genesis block, B G contains a dummy value. To ensure that each replica has an identical dummy value, we ask each replica to assume this block contains a hash of the initial list of primaries, B G := H (P 1 , P 2 , ..., P z ).
To guarantee validity of a blockchain, standard blockchain designs [21] suggest that each subsequent block (B i ) in the ledger includes the hash of the previous block (B i−1 ) in the chain, that is, B i = {H (B i−1 ), ...}. In ResilientDB, we employ the MultiBFT paradigm which takes as input a BFT consensus protocol, which ensure that all the requests for each round are replicated. Hence, we can construct a proof of such replication. Such a proof already yields a guarantee that the newly created block is valid.
We require the execute-thread to create a new block for round r once it completes executing all the transactions for a round r . In this block, the execute-thread stores: (i) proof of replication for all the z client requests executed in round r , (ii) identifiers of the primaries of all the z instances, and (iii) identifiers of the clients. Note that we do not store the client requests and the responses in the ledger, we store these in a separate table indexed by the round number. Further, our ResilientDB also provides an in-memory key-value store. This key-value store provides fast access to client records.
Cryptographic Constructs. ResilientDB supports efficient signing and verification of messages. We employ NIST recommended cryptographic [5] constructs for secure communication. To sign messages between replicas, we use message authentication codes based on CMAC-AES. For communication between client and replicas, we employ ED25519-based digital signatures [34] . To ensure integrity of messages, we use SHA256 [50, 65] to generate hashes message digests.
EVALUATION
We now present an empirical evaluation of our MultiBFT paradigm on ResilientDB against the well-known Pbft, Zyzzyva, and HotStuff consensus protocols. As MultiBFT takes as input any primary-backup BFT protocol, we created MultiBFT variants of Pbft and Zyzzyva, which we denote by MultiP and MultiZ, respectively. As HotStuff changes primary in every consensus round, we did not build a MultiBFT variant of this protocol. In specific, the goal of our evaluation is to answer the following questions:
(Q1) How does the MultiBFT paradigm (MultiP and MultiZ) compares to the protocols Pbft and Zyzzyva? (Q2) How does the system performance of the MultiBFT paradigm compare to HotStuff? (Q3) Does MultiBFT benefit from batching client requests? (Q4) How scalable is MultiBFT with respect to the number of replicas? (Q5) How scalable is MultiBFT under multiple replica failures and collusion attack?
Other Protocols in ResilientDB
For fair comparison, we also associate our parallel-pipelined architecture of ResilientDB with the other three protocols, Pbft, Zyzzyva and HotStuff. Further, we allow these protocols to also employ batching and permit them to proceed with consensus of a succeeding request, while the consensus on the preceding request is ongoing. As the MultiBFT paradigm allows f + 1 instances to work in parallel, we also parallelize the tasks in both Pbft and Zyzzyva by giving them 12 threads (three threads each for input, output and batching, and one thread each for worker, execution and checkpoints). HotStuff [74] incurs a latency of four phases to replicate a request. In their paper, the authors lay down two designs, one that requires threshold signatures and the other that needs proofs from the primary. In HotStuff, each phase consists of two subphases: the primary replica starts each phase by broadcasting a message, and each replica only replies back to the primary. The primary then combines these replies and send a summary back to the replicas (e.g., by forwarding digital signatures of all messages, which can be compressed using threshold signatures). Interestingly, the evaluation of HotStuff neither uses threshold signatures, nor is there any available standard implementation. Hence, we also skip using threshold signatures. We opt to not penalize HotStuff with large summaries, either. Note that, in any case, HotStuff requires expensive digital signatures in each phase, which are not required by other BFT protocols such as Pbft. HotStuff changes its primary replica after every third phase; our implementation optimizes this primary change by allowing all consecutive primaries to run in parallel, making HotStuff another parallel protocol.
Setup
Our experiments are performed on the Google Cloud. We deploying our replicas on c2 machines with a 16-core Intel Xeon Cascade Lake CPU running at 3.8GHz and with 32GB memory. For large setups, we use 30-core machines with 60GB memory. We deploy up to 1 million clients on 50 machines. We run each experiment for 180 seconds: the 60 seconds are warmup, and results are collected over the next 120 seconds. We average our results over three runs. In all experiments, we use batching with a batch size to 100, unless explicitly stated otherwise. With a batch size of 100, the size of Pre-Prepare messages is 5400 bytes, Response messages is 1748 bytes, and other messages are 250 bytes.
In each experiment, the workload is provided by the Yahoo Cloud Serving Benchmark (YCSB) [16] . Each client request queries a YCSB table that holds half an million active records. We require 90% of the requests to be write queries. Prior to the experiments, each replica is initialized with an identical copy of the YCSB table. The client requests generated by YCSB follow a Zipfian distribution and are heavily skewed (skew factor 0.9).
Impact of Batching
First, we analyze the performance of all five consensus protocols as a function of the batch size. We use batch sizes between 10 and 800. For these experiments, we employ 32 replicas for consensus. Hence, in both MultiP and MultiZ, we have 11 instances replicating requests in parallel. MultiZ attains the highest throughput among all the protocols on varying the batch size. This behavior is expected, as each replica in MultiZ has to undergo just one phase and is running 11 instances in parallel. However, there are cases where both MultiP and MultiZ attain nearly the same throughput. The key bottleneck for these MultiBFT variants is the execute-thread. Note that the executethread not only has to sequentially execute all client transactions, but also creates and signs client responses. Hence, even though MultiZ sends out much less messages than MultiP, the executethread limits its throughput.
Protocols like Pbft and Zyzzyva are limited by their design as there is no available parallelism. It is Zyzzyva's single phase that helps it to achieve much higher throughput than Pbft. However, when the batch size is very large, Zyzzyva also starts saturating due to single worker-thread handling all the tasks at the non-primary replicas. Finally, HotStuff faces low throughput due to use of expensive digital signatures, which makes its worker-thread computationally bounded. Furthermore, HotStuff incurs a latency of four phases. In our ResilientDB, we give HotStuff an optimistic implementation with two batching threads at each replica, we allow all of its replicas to act as primaries, and do not require it to send any proofs. Despite this, it still has low throughput.
As the size of the batch increases, the throughput increases for all protocols. This increase is more pronounced when transitioning between smaller batch sizes. At smaller batch sizes, each replica has to undergo a larger number of consensuses. Hence, they have low throughputs. By aggregating requests into larger batches, fewer rounds of consensuses are required, which in turn helps in increasing the system throughput. However, for the larger batches, all protocols see their throughputs reaching saturation. This is a result of high communication costs due to the transmission of large batches. These results show that MultiZ is able to attain up to 74% more throughput than Zyzzyva, MultiP attains 2× more throughput than Pbft and 3.2× more than HotStuff. Figure 9 (b) presents the average latency in sending a response to the client for its transaction. In these figures, we observe that Pbft, in general, incurs higher latencies than the other protocols. This is a result of Pbft requiring three phases to replicate a request. The client latency reduces substantially for the Pbft protocol when increasing the batch size. Among the two MultiBFT variants, Mul-tiP has the least latency. This might seem surprising, but it is an artifact of Zyzzyva's design. In Zyzzyva, each client waits for messages from all n ≥ 3f + 1 replicas. Hence, when the system is under high load (such as in MultiZ where there are 11 parallel instances), the client has to wait for the slowest replica, whereas in Pbft the client only has to wait for the fastest f + 1 replicas. Due to similar reasons, Zyzzyva has higher latency than Pbft. However, Pbft and HotStuff incur 2× and 3.22× more latency than MultiP, respectively
Impact on Scalability
Next, we study the performance of different consensus protocols as a function of the number of replicas participating in consensus. We use between 4 and 46 replicas. 5 For both MultiP and MultiZ the number of parallel instances depend on the total number of replicas. E.g., with n = 16 replicas, we have 6 primary instances, each of which is on a distinct replica. Figure 10 (a) shows that on increasing the number of replicas, there is a decrease in throughput for each protocol. This decrease could be attributed to the subsequent increase in communication. For example, in the Pbft protocol the 16 replicas transmit 256 messages in the Commit phase, in comparison to 16 messages transmitted for a setup having 4 replicas. This quadratic increase in the number of messages transmitted causes the observed reduction in throughput.
We observe that the relative increase in parallelism in our Multi-BFT variants offsets the decrease in throughput significantly compared to Pbft and Zyzzyva. Indeed, we observe that MultiBFT benefits from increasing the number of replicas, even if the underlying protocols suffer from higher communication costs: the performance of Pbft drops by 41% (43% for Zyzzyva) whereas the performance of MultiP only drops by 22% (26% for MultiZ) when moving from 32 to 46 replicas. Hence, the parallel nature of Multi-BFT improves scalability. The benefit of these parallel instances can also be observed when moving from 4 to 8 replicas: in this case, MultiP sees an increase in throughput. Furthermore, due to their parallelism, both MultiP and MultiZ are able to achieve higher throughput than Zyzzyva. Indeed, even though MultiP has higher communication cost than the single phase of Zyzzyva, the relative increase in parallelism is able to offset this cost, making MultiP faster.
For HotStuff the limited throughput is in correspondence with the reasons stated in the previous section. However, as HotStuff has linear communication complexity (in our design), it scales better than consensus protocols such as Pbft that have a quadratic complexity.
Similar arguments hold for the latency incurred by the clients of different protocols. Note that by giving Pbft as an input to our MultiBFT paradigm, we are able to ensure that Pbft, which incurred highest latency among all the protocol, now incurs the least latency as MultiP.
Impact of Failures
We now evaluate the performance of our protocols under failures. For these experiments, we require clients and replicas to timeout after 15s and 10s, respectively, if they are unable to receive any required messages. As finding the right timeout value is hard and system-dependent [52] , we chose these small constant values. 7.5.1 Attack on One Replica. Figure 11a presents the system throughput as function of the number of replicas on the failure of a non-primary replica. Such a failure could be due to one of the two reasons: (i) the replica crashed, or (ii) one of the primaries acted malicious and did not send requests to this replica (replica in dark). In the former case, we assume the replica did not recover until the end of the experiment, while in the latter case, we assume the replica continuously requests view-change, but is never successful. It is evident from the figure that the system throughput did not change for protocols like MultiP, Pbft and HotStuff. For these protocols, a single failure does not impact their respective designs. On the contrary, a single failure may help these protocols to achieve higher throughput, as message contention is reduced, especially for protocols like Pbft and MultiP which have a quadratic communication complexity. However, there is a significant decrease in throughput for both Zyzzyva and MultiZ.
This reduction can be attributed to Zyzzyva's choice to optimize for the best-case situation. For optimal performance, Zyzzyva requires that all n replicas are non-faulty. In Zyzzyva, a client waits for all n replicas to send an identical response before marking the request as complete. If this does not happen, then the client will eventually timeout and enter a recovery mode [35] . This timeout period causes a sharp decrease in Zyzzyva's throughput when failures happen, as the client is idle waiting for the timeout. Although we allow millions of clients, ultimately all of them start to timeout. Prior works [14, 15] have similarly observed that Zyzzyva's throughput plummets to zero under failures.
As MultiZ inherits Zyzzyva's design, it also observes a similar reduction in its throughput. Although it has more parallelism, this parallelism cannot eliminate an artifact of the underlying consensus protocol like Zyzzyva, which depends on its clients for ordering the transactions.
7.5.
2 Attack on f Replicas. Figure 11b illustrates an extensive attack, where a primary replica attempts to affect f non-faulty replicas. This could be a result of f replicas crashing at the same time, or malicious primaries not sending the correct request to f replicas (replicas in dark). In this situation, these non-faulty replicas timeout and call for primary replacement, but they do not succeed as they require at least f + 1 replicas to support their cause. Note that from the perspective of the remaining non-faulty replicas it is impossible to determine if these f replicas, requesting for a viewchange, are actually saying the truth, as the system can have up to f byzantine-malicious-replicas.
It is visible from this figure that the system throughput decreases when there are f failures. This is a straightforward consequence from the fact that the system is handling the maximum number of failures. In MultiP (or Pbft), each instance (or replica) needs exactly n − f Commit messages from the remaining replicas, and, hence, has to wait for even the slowest remaining replica. Similarly, primaries in HotStuff need exactly n− f messages to start the next phase. Hence the replicas have to wait for all operating replicas, including the slowest replica, whereas without failures they only have to wait for the fastest n − f replicas. For MultiZ and Zyzzyva, arguments similar to the ones stated in previous section hold.
Collusion Attack.
We now illustrate a form of collusion attack which can easily affect any parallel protocol and can cause a subsequent decrease in their throughput if not handled correctly. In Figure 12 , we run consensus among 32 replicas and allow one of the 11 primaries (total 11 instances) to act malicious. This primary prevents one replica from replicating a request (say transaction 397). Hence, this replica waits 10s before requesting a view-change. At the same time, all f byzantine replicas claim that at least one nonfaulty primary is malicious and transmit view-change messages to remove this primary. Hence, at each replica, the coordinator-thread receives f + 1 view-change messages from distinct replicas.
Each coordinator-thread waits some more time (5s) to reach a guarantee that this is a form of collusion attack. We are employing our MultiBFT paradigm's optimistic recovery mechanism (see Figure 11 : System throughput under failure as a function of the number of replicas with 100 requests/batch. We allow at most 3f replicas to be active at any time during the consensus. Figure 12 : A collusion attack by malicious replicas on a system with 32 replicas. Here, a malicious primary prevents the 0-th instance of non-faulty replica 12, to replicate a request, which causes this replica to timeout. All the malicious replicas blame multiple non-faulty primaries as malicious. This leads to f + 1 view-change messages from distinct replicas and triggers state-exchange through unification.
Section 3.4.3). Hence, after detecting collusion, replicas exchanges contracts and recover. The size of these contracts exchanged in our setup is around 175KB. After recovery, the affected replica starts working again. This attack is an example of a false alarm in which the malicious replicas are trying to remove a good primary. In single-primary protocols, this attack cannot happen, but parallel protocols such as MultiBFT need to address this attack. Indeed, under this attack, any parallelized protocol which employs a simple Pbft-style view-change protocol will have virtually zero throughput.
As all the instances are continuously replicating requests for a majority of the non-faulty replicas, our MultiP protocol continues achieving high throughput despite the attack. MultiZ faces a single replica failure and, hence, as before sees its throughput plummet.
RELATED WORK
Consensus has been widely studied by the distributed computing community. We restrict ourselves to research addressing some of the issues addressed by MultiBFT. First, we notice that many primarybackup crash-fault tolerant consensus protocols exists (e.g. [38, 43, 51, 52, 66] ). Although we designed our MultiBFT paradigm for byzantine failures, it can easily incorporate crash-fault tolerant protocols.
Traditional BFT protocols. The practical interest in BFT consensus [8, 9, 44] started with the three-phase PBFT protocol [10] [11] [12] , after which many protocols that try to improve on PBFT have been proposed (e.g. [33, 36, 37, 47, 71, 73] ). Most of these protocols have presented optimizations to Pbft, without addressing the issues associated with dedicated primaries. Other attempts to improve throughput of a BFT consensus can be grouped under three heads: (i) quorum-based, (ii) speculative execution, and (iii) trusted components.Quorum-based approaches [1, 18, 41, 45, 61] reduce communication to achieve consensus by reducing resilience to failures. However, either they cannot handle conflicting operations or require non-byzantine components. Speculative execution-based approaches [22, 30, 35, 59] provide good throughput in case of no-failures, but depend on clients. This causes a severe drop in their throughput with even one failure. Trusted component-based approaches [6, 13, 17, 32, 68] reduce the cost of BFT consensus through the use of a non-malicious component that guarantees successful ordering. Most of these protocols follow a primary-backup design and provide Requirements R1 to R4. Hence, these protocols can be combined with our MultiBFT paradigm.
Sharding. Several works [19, 24, 39, 42, 70, 75] employ sharding to partition data stored at a replica. The key advantage of adopting the principle of sharding is that each shard can manage its own set of client requests. This helps to parallelize consensus if a request requires access to only one shard of data. If the transaction requires access to several shards, then a sharding-based design faces very low throughputs [19] . Note that the design of our MultiBFT paradigm is orthogonal to these approaches. Within each shard, these sharding approaches often employ a primary-backup protocol such as Pbft. Hence, our MultiBFT paradigm can be used inside each shard to help increase throughput.
Similar to sharding-based designs, there are works which use directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) instead of (block)chains. [3, 7, 40, 62, 63] . DAG-based consensus protocols also assume that a small set of replicas will work independently, and will replicate their own set of requests. Some of these approaches use a primary-backup approach, which raises another opportunity for our MultiBFT paradigm.
Other multiple-primary designs. Prior to our MultiBFT paradigm, several other works proposed designs in which multiple replicas can be primary [4, 23, 39, 64] . None of these designs provide the continuous-ordering property of MultiBFT, however, and lack throughput under attacks. Indeed, these protocols do not present how to detect and resolve collusion attacks from multiple primaries. E.g., a recent work, MirBFT [64] , attempts replacing malicious primaries using the view-change protocol of Pbft. As Pbft requires only f + 1 replicas to trigger a view change, this protocol would easily fail in the false alarm trap that we depicted in Section 7.5.3 (Figure 12) . Moreover, the authors show in their paper that MirBFT protocol attains virtually zero throughput under such attacks. Our MultiBFT paradigm, on the other hand, can handle such attacks and maintains its high throughput in all cases.
CONCLUSIONS
We present MultiBFT, a new paradigm for the design of efficient primary-backup BFT consensus protocols. MultiBFT improves existing BFT protocols by enabling them to continuously order client-transactions, this by introducing parallelism in their design. We show that the resulting parallelized BFT protocols are safe and live, attain up to 2× higher throughput, and have lower latency than their original non-parallelized counterparts.
